The Somali pirates

29 successful hijackings from 114 attempted attacks

An international naval flotilla, consisting of approximately 25 warships from the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Turkey, and India, currently sits off the coast of the Horn of Africa, patrolling the dangerous waters of the Gulf of Aden.  Its target: the Somali pirates who last year attacked a record high 111 commercial ships and successfully hijacked 42 of them.  Unfortunately, piracy is not the most severe of Somalia’s calamities.  As a result of 18 years of continuous civil war, it is also plagued by a massive humanitarian crisis and has become a lawless sanctuary for extremist forces seeking to enforce a strict interpretation of

 the sharia (Islamic law) and organize terrorist operations.  Although the United States chose to lead the international naval contingent to combat the pirates, it should examine its history of failed military intervention in Somalia, before it deploys any troops on the ground.  Instead, the United States should work to resolve the Somali predicament by involving Somalis, strengthening the moderates within the factions vying for control of Mogadishu and supporting the governments of the more stable regions of Somalia. 

Piracy

Despite the international naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, the rate of pirate attacks has risen from last year’s record high.  Thus far in 2009, there have been 29 successful hijackings from 114 attempted attacks.  If the pirates continue at this rate, there will be over twice as many attacks and approximately ten more successful ones than last year.  Although the headlines were relatively quiet about pirate attacks in the first three months of 2009, the pirates themselves did not disappear.  They have moved south, away from the Gulf of Aden (where the international force is concentrated) and toward the high seas.  By extending their range, the pirates have made it more difficult for the international force to control them.  After all, there are only a few dozen ships patrolling an area as large as the Mediterranean and Red Seas combined. 

The decision by many of the world’s most powerful countries to act against the pirates instead of paying ransoms was a good first step, but the current force is not a long term solution.  First of all, a force of approximately 25 vessels lacks the sufficient range to protect shipping throughout the Gulf of Aden and the north-west Indian Ocean and therefore cannot deter pirates entirely.  Secondly, even if the international community decides to increase the size of this force and extend its coverage to the southern coast of Somalia and further into the high seas, it is likely the pirates will adapt as they have to the presence of the current international force.

A number of policy alternatives exist for the United States for dealing with the threat of Somali piracy to commercial shipping.  One option is to deploy forces and attack Somali pirate outposts on the coast in an attempt to deprive the pirates of a base of operation and force them into other, more legitimate industries.  This will be difficult for the U.S., however, because of its past experiences of military intervention in Somalia.  Although the deployment of U.S. troops to Somalia in the early 1990s was primarily for humanitarian purposes, the U.S. soon found itself trapped in an imbroglio of inter-clan violence.  In October 1993, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and eighteen U.S. rangers were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu during an operation targeting one of the leading warlords of Somalia, Mohamed Farrah Aidid.  The U.S. withdrew in shame and entered a phase of semi-isolationism, aiming to avoid similar military and political debacles.  Though the United States has healed its wounds and has once again embraced its role as the lone superpower, there undoubtedly still exists a stigma around intervention in Somalia.  Acquiring the political support for the introduction of ground troops—even if isolated to the coast—will be near impossible for President Obama.  Moreover, as long as piracy is biggest moneymaker in Somalia (estimates suggest the pirates accrued up to $80 million dollars in untaxed ransoms in 2008), pirates  will only cease their operations temporarily, patiently waiting for the withdrawal of forces to resume their work.

A more effective and practical option is to cooperate with the moderate forces in Somalia, particularly the functioning government of the Puntland, to train a Somali coast guard to combat the piracy industry.  The coast guard should be supplemented by an educational campaign to discourage new recruits and convince active pirates to quit, a rehabilitation program for former pirates, and a reinstitution of the abandoned fishing industry as a viable alternative to piracy.  This will enable the United States to not only reduce the threat of piracy but also to avoid stoking anti-western sentiment and legitimizing extremist forces.  Moreover, by providing many unemployed Somalis with work, it will help mollify Somalis’ resentment toward the international community for ignoring the humanitarian crisis that ails their country.

Humanitarian Crisis

The world has withdrawn its attention from Somalia because the humanitarian crisis, which has persisted for 18 years, appears hopeless.  In 1991, when the government of Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre collapsed, the country exploded, with the warlords of Somalia competing for power, money, and other resources.  After 18 years of civil war and 14 failed attempts at government, Somalia hardly deserves the title of a “failed state”.  It is much worse.  The current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) controls no more than a few blocks in Mogadishu, and is dependent upon African Union troops for even that.  More importantly, it cannot provide education, healthcare, infrastructure or any other minimal services to its citizens. 

Meanwhile, the Somalis have suffered from this ongoing conflict in an indescribable way.  Over the past decade, hundred of thousands have died due to factional fighting, famine, or disease.  In the last two years alone, over one million Somalis have been displaced and more than 22,000 have been killed.  The primary targets of insurgents are humanitarian workers, journalists, and human rights activists.  According to United Nations estimates, three million are in need of food assistance.  Rape, killing, and looting are widespread.  An entire generation of Somalis has seen nothing but civil war, and some who fled Somalia, have never seen their home.  A Somali man himself said he had given up dreaming about a better future for his family.

Solutions to the humanitarian crisis are scarce.  Since there is no capable central government to collect and redistribute aid or to protect humanitarian organizations in Somalia, it is extremely difficult for the international community to do anything at this time.  The United States, at least, seems quite cognizant of this fact.  In 2008 it provided $318 million in aid to Somalia, whereas the Obama administration has requested only $103 million for FY 2010. 

Extremism 

The Somali civil war has been an 18-year-long struggle among numerous factions to consolidate power over a country that could hardly unite under the rule of a single dictator.  It has involved warlords, drug lords, Islamists, secularists, Ethiopia, the United States, the United Nations, and the African Union, with different groups nominally controlling the country at different times throughout the conflict.  At this point, the most powerful group is Al Shabaab, an Islamic militant organization that seeks to impose a strict interpretation of sharia law on Somalis.  Al Shabaab and its allies, such as the Hisbul al Islamiyya, have consolidated control over the central and southern regions of Somalia and have been encroaching farther into the TFG-controlled territory in Mogadishu.  These groups are the ones responsible for the radical policies of banning men and women from using public transportation together, stoning women for adultery—including a 13 year old girl who claimed she was raped—and public cross amputation for accused thieves.

And these are the groups the United States fears.  The Islamist insurgents are spreading across the country, having already found a niche for themselves and other jihadist groups.  The suicide bomber who killed four South Korean tourists and their guide in Yemen on March 15, Abdel Rahman Mehdi al-Aajbari, underwent training at a camp in Al Shabaab controlled southern Somalia.  Even more frightening, some Somali-Americans have returned to Somalia to train in terrorist camps, including the first American suicide bomber, Shirwa Ahmad.  The lawlessness of failed states appeals to terrorist organizations, which seek refuge from international search efforts and require a base for training operations. 

In the worst case scenario, Al Shabaab, Hisbul al Islamiyya, and their allies defeat the TFG, seize control of Mogadishu (in addition to southern and central regions of Somalia), and Somalia becomes another Afghanistan, attracting external terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, who seek to capitalize on the ongoing civil war and export violence to other parts of the world.  The U.S. may feel the need to intervene and crush the emerging threat, but of course, that comes with the possibility of another military fiasco.

In the best case scenario, the TFG garners sufficient support among Somali clans to at least temporarily resist the insurgency’s offensive.  But even in this case, the TFG, which lacks capacity, accountability, and credibility, is unlikely to permanently defeat the insurgency, much less foster a political settlement.  

The United States can help build a foundation for a future settlement in a number of ways.  First, it needs to accept that force is out of the question.  Military intervention not only risks the lives of American soldiers, but it also breeds resentment and thus gives justification to extremist movements’ violence and repression.  They become nationalists, fighting for Somali sovereignty rather than the ruthless opposition.   Second, it must realize that any lasting solution must be devised by Somalis.  There have been 14 failed internationally sponsored attempts at government in Somalia since Mohamed Siad Barre was deposed in 1991.  The world cannot impose a regime on Somalia.  Third, the U.S. can strengthen moderate elements within Somalia by sanctioning and taking other measures against the most extreme groups.  Though this may involve giving support to Islamist movements who aim to institute the sharia to a certain extent, they are an alternative to the extremist groups like Al Shabaab.  Finally, the U.S. should promote cooperation among the different regions of Somalia.   The TFG, Somaliland, Puntland, and other forces could form a coalition to contain the advances of most radical elements of the insurgency politically and militarily, serving as a basis for a future federalist Somali state.

Conclusion

Though the issue of piracy tends to dominate the international media coverage of Somalia, the humanitarian crisis and the spread of extremism in Somalia are more impactful.  The former affects not only Somalis who are killed, wounded, or forced to flee their homes, but also the neighbors of Somalia, including the international and domestic ones which absorb the millions of refugees and internally displaced persons.  The latter could threaten international security anywhere in the world, as terrorist groups like Al Qaeda find the lawlessness and Islamic extremism of Somalia more and more welcoming.  But the solution for the multi-faceted Somali predicament does not involve the use of force.  Instead, the international community must work to strengthen the moderate elements in Somalia to bring order to the lawless country and create an environment suitable for a settlement to this 18-year conflict.  It must help Somalis devise a solution independently so that it may be a legitimate and lasting one.

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